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THE ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF NEIL GORSUCH 
JOHN M. NEWMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 In 2017, the U.S. Senate confirmed Neil M. Gorsuch’s nomination to serve on the Su-
preme Court. Like Justice Stevens before him, Gorsuch’s primary area of expertise is anti-
trust law. Like Stevens, Gorsuch both practiced and taught in the field before joining the 
bench. As a judge for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gorsuch penned multiple substan-
tive antitrust opinions. 
 His unique expertise will likely situate Gorsuch as one of the Court’s leading voices on 
antitrust matters for decades to come. A close examination of his prior antitrust opinions 
thus offers vital insight into his approach to antitrust principles and execution. This Essay 
provides the first in-depth descriptive and prescriptive analysis of Gorsuch’s antitrust juris-
prudence. While it reveals (perhaps unsurprisingly) a great deal of sophistication vis-à-vis 
antitrust doctrine, it also identifies several areas for improvement. 
 While serving on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch effectively expanded upon—even rewrote—
existing precedent, including Justice Scalia’s notable opinion for the majority in Trinko. For 
normative force, Gorsuch’s jurisprudence at times rested upon logical fallacies and an undu-
ly one-sided error-cost framework. This Essay offers prescriptive suggestions for Gorsuch 
and other jurists to follow in future cases, with an eye toward producing a more transpar-
ent, coherent, and welfare-maximizing body of antitrust law. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On January 31, 2017, President Donald Trump nominated Judge 
Neil M. Gorsuch, then sitting on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
to serve as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.1 Following a conten-
tious debate and the invocation of the so-called “nuclear option,” the 
U.S. Senate confirmed Gorsuch’s nomination.2 On April 10, 2017, 
Gorsuch was sworn in as the Supreme Court’s 113th Justice. 
 Gorsuch’s primary area of expertise is antitrust law. Like Justice 
Stevens,3 Gorsuch both practiced antitrust law as an attorney and 
taught antitrust as a professor.4 As a private attorney, Gorsuch “made 
a name for himself in the antitrust world” by representing both plain-
tiffs and defendants in high-stakes antitrust litigation.5 As a professor, 
Gorsuch drew admiration from his students.6 And as an appellate 
judge, Gorsuch penned multiple substantive antitrust opinions.7 
 Gorsuch’s unique expertise in antitrust law will likely situate him 
as one of the Court’s leading voices on antitrust matters for decades 
to come. A close examination of his prior antitrust opinions thus of-
fers vital insight into his jurisprudential attitudes toward, and ap-
proach to, antitrust principles and execution.8 Understanding anti-
trust precedent, particularly when it originates from an expert in the 
                                                                                                                       
 1. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/ 
supreme-court-nominee-trump.html. 
 2. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed to Supreme Court After Senate Uses 
‘Nuclear Option’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2f017, 7:33 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ 
congress/neil-gorsuch-confirmed-supreme-court-after-senate-uses-nuclear-option-n743766 
[https://perma.cc/2ZTC-CKC8]. 
 3. See Mark R. Patterson, Justice Stevens and Market Relationships in Antitrust, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1809 (2006). 
 4. Lauren Salins, Supreme Court Nominee Neil Gorsuch Has Significant Antitrust Expe-
rience, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-
nominee-neil-gorsuch-has-significant-antitrust-experience [https://perma.cc/W4T8-ZDAR]. 
 5. Carl W. Hittinger & Tyson Y. Herrold, Antitrust Legacy of High Court Nominee 
Gorsuch in Private Practice, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 6, 2017), 
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/home/id=1202780550273/Antitrust-Legacy-of-High-
Court-Nominee-Gorsuch-in-Private-Practice?mcode=1202615324341&curindex=1 
[https://perma.cc/5GL4-HQV4]. 
 6. Alex Burness, Students of Supreme Court Candidate Neil Gorsuch at CU Law 
School Cite Fairness, Dedication to Truth, DENVER POST (Jan. 31, 2017, 12:06 PM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/01/31/supreme-court-neil-gorsuch-cu-law-school-students/ 
[https://perma.cc/6K8K-LC3E]. 
 7. See infra Part II (descriptively summarizing Gorsuch’s antitrust opinions). 
 8. Of the approximately 3,000 Tenth Circuit panel decisions in which Gorsuch partic-
ipated, he included Kay Electric Cooperative on a list of his ten “most significant” decisions. 
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 115TH CONG., QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NOMINEE TO THE SUPREME 
COURT 25-34 (2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch% 
20SJQ%20(Public).pdf [https://perma.cc/H9YM-DVN3]. 
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field, requires a depth of treatment often lacking in public discourse. 
This is doubly true when that discourse is highly politically 
charged—as was the environment surrounding Gorsuch’s nomina-
tion.9 Thus, for example, a contemporary commentator observed 
(without further explanation or authoritative support) that in one 
case, Four Corners,10 “Gorsuch found no antitrust violations despite 
substantial evidence that a dominant player used its power to push 
out rivals.”11 As explained infra, however, there was little to no evi-
dence of competitive harm in Four Corners.12 Moreover, this claim 
was urged as proof that “Gorsuch has repeatedly blessed actions by 
big firms to exploit their dominant position.”13 Yet the defendant in 
Four Corners was a nonprofit hospital serving a rural town of 
18,000—hardly a “dominant” “big firm.”14 
 This Essay provides the first in-depth descriptive and prescriptive 
analysis of Gorsuch’s antitrust jurisprudence. This analysis reveals 
(perhaps unsurprisingly) a great deal of expertise and sophistication 
vis-à-vis antitrust doctrine. But it also identifies some areas for im-
provement. While on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch at times showed a 
great deal of judicial restraint, issuing elegantly narrow rulings that 
paid appropriate deference to Supreme Court precedent.15 At times, 
however, Gorsuch’s opinions subtly—but substantially—deviated 
from the dictates of binding precedent. Perhaps most notably, Gor-
such’s opinions in Four Corners16 and Novell17 expanded the scope 
and altered the substantive content of Justice Scalia’s notable major-
ity opinion in Trinko.18 And in Four Corners, Gorsuch announced a 
novel requirement for proving antitrust injury that—contrary to 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent19—is not based on the type of 
                                                                                                                       
 9. See, e.g., Ted Barrett, Senate Faces Nuclear Showdown Over Neil Gorsuch Nomi-
nation, CNN (Apr. 3, 2017, 9:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/03/politics/senate-
nuclear-neil-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/6QYR-DJMP]. 
 10. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 11. Zephyr Teachout, Neil Gorsuch Sides with Big Business, Big Donors and Big Boss-
es, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/ 
02/21/neil-gorsuch-always-sides-with-big-business-big-donors-and-big-bosses/?utm_term= 
.2b924a671738 [https://perma.cc/78RE-AKJ8]. 
 12. See infra Part III (normatively critiquing Gorsuch’s antitrust jurisprudence). 
 13. Teachout, supra note 11. 
 14. 582 F.3d at 1217. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. 582 F.3d 1216. 
 17. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 18. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004) (Scalia, J.). 
 19. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
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harm alleged, but on the remedy sought.20 Such departures from es-
tablished doctrine, especially by a lower court, could be viewed as 
unwarranted “judicial activism.”21 
 The normative bases for these moves also suggest room for im-
provement in future antitrust cases. At times, Gorsuch’s reasoning 
exhibits logical fallacies. It also evinces an unduly one-sided concep-
tion (and application) of the widely employed error-cost framework of 
decisionmaking. Like most modern jurists, Gorsuch appears to value 
a coherent, transparent, efficient, and welfare-maximizing body of 
antitrust law. To further those goals, these issues warrant correction 
in future decisions. 
 This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II descriptively summarizes 
the facts, holdings, and rationales at play in then-Judge Gorsuch’s 
Tenth Circuit antitrust opinions. Part III critiques those opinions. 
For normative force, this critique depends primarily on doctrinal, log-
ical, and consequentialist grounds. More specifically, this critique 
begins with the propositions that departures from binding precedent 
and internal inconsistencies are undesirable, and that transparency 
in judicial decisionmaking (particularly in the area of antitrust) is 
desirable. As a recent Supreme Court antitrust opinion rightly ob-
served, “[b]y exposing their reasoning, judges . . . are subjected to 
others’ critical analyses, which in turn can lead to better understand-
ing for the future.”22 Building on the normative critique in Part III, 
Part IV offers several prescriptive recommendations for improving 
future antitrust jurisprudence. Part V briefly concludes. 
II.   OPINIONS 
 As a Tenth Circuit judge, Gorsuch penned three substantive anti-
trust decisions. One of these, Kay Electric,23 dealt with the state-
action doctrine. The remaining two, Four Corners24 and Novell,25 were 
treated by Gorsuch as refusal-to-deal cases. (As Part III, infra, 
demonstrates, however, Four Corners is more properly understood as 
involving an exclusive-dealing claim.) The following Sections describe 
the facts, holdings, and rationales of these opinions. 
                                                                                                                       
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
 21. Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1442-43 (2004) (describing the widespread condemnation of, and wide-
spread confusion over what is meant by, “judicial activism”). 
 22. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (quoting P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 1500, at 364 (1986)). 
 23. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 24. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 25. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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A.   State Action: Kay Electric 
 In Kay Electric, Judge Gorsuch faced an appeal involving the 
state-action doctrine, which shields certain state activities from fed-
eral antitrust scrutiny. Newkirk, a city in Oklahoma, and Kay, a pri-
vately owned cooperative, both serviced rural electric customers. 
When Kay offered to provide electricity to a new jail outside 
Newkirk’s geographic boundaries, the city annexed the area, then 
threatened to withhold sewage services from the jail unless the jail 
selected Newkirk as its electric provider. Newkirk’s complete monop-
oly over sewage services made this, in effect, an offer the jail could 
not refuse. Kay sued the city, alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act. 
 The district court applied the two-pronged Midcal test for state 
action, which requires both a clearly articulated intent to displace 
competition and active supervision by the state.26 As to the “clear ar-
ticulation” prong, the court held that “foreseeable” anticompetitive 
effects will suffice.27 And, since an Oklahoma statute granted broad 
power to municipalities to establish and operate public utilities, the 
court concluded that Midcal’s first prong was satisfied. Oklahoma 
had begun deregulating electricity markets with its Electric Restruc-
turing Act of 1997, potentially leaving room for antitrust scrutiny—
but (per the lower court) the lack of any implementing rules or regu-
lations rendered that Act irrelevant to the state-action inquiry.28 
With that settled, the court decided that the “active supervision” 
prong was also met, and that the city’s conduct was shielded from 
antitrust liability. 
 Judge Gorsuch, writing for the Tenth Circuit in characteristically 
vivid style,29 reversed. His opinion begins by noting a fairly sophisti-
cated distinction between the state-action doctrine, which is motivat-
ed by federalist concerns, and core antitrust doctrine, which (under 
the consensus view) is motivated by economic conceptions of efficien-
cy and consumer welfare.30 It also notes the distinction—overlooked 
by the district court—between state and municipality action. Gener-
ally, municipal conduct receives state-action immunity where the 
                                                                                                                       
 26. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980) (citing City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). 
 27. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, No. CIV-10-347-C, 2010 WL 3222477, at *2 
(W.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2010), rev’d 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 28. Id. at *3. 
 29. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 1041 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Finding 
themselves stuck between a rock and a pile of sewage, the operators of the jail reluctantly 
went with the city’s package deal.”). 
 30. Id. at 1041. This early portion of the opinion also typifies Gorsuch’s Socratic-
writing style, which often uses questions to introduce new topics. 
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“clear articulation” prong of Midcal is present; the “active supervi-
sion” prong is not required.31 
 Next, Judge Gorsuch offered a gentle correction of the district 
court’s reasoning by noting that there is, in fact, some confusion over 
whether “foreseeable” anticompetitive results alone are enough for a 
“clear articulation” of state policy.32 Gorsuch also lightly chided the 
Supreme Court for this lack of doctrinal clarity and suggested a po-
tential improvement. Citing with approval the leading treatise, 
which proposes a bright-line “clear articulation” requirement under 
which “foreseeable results” alone would not suffice, Gorsuch observed 
that such a rule “makes quite a lot of sense.”33 But, he continued, 
“[H]owever much sense this makes . . . our lot as a lower court isn’t to 
choose between the Supreme Court’s holdings but to apply them.”34 
 In any event, the doctrinal confusion turned out not to matter 
much. Gorsuch elegantly managed to navigate the relevant precedent 
by reasoning that at least “foreseeable results” are required—and, if 
absent, the city’s defense would fail regardless of what the proper 
rule actually was.35 With that in mind, Gorsuch was able to approach 
the task as essentially one of statutory interpretation, invoking the 
canon lex specialis derogat legi generali.36 That task, to a jurist, offers 
relatively familiar ground. 
 The opinion thus delved more deeply than had the district court 
into the relevant Oklahoma legislation. In particular, Gorsuch found 
most relevant the Rural Electric Cooperative Act.37 That Act author-
ized electric cooperatives to continue operating even in city-annexed 
areas and proscribed cities from hindering such operations.38 Contra-
ry to the district court, Gorsuch found the deregulatory (but tooth-
less) Electric Restructuring Act to cut against finding state-action 
immunity.39 It was not “the place of a court,” Gorsuch wrote, “to say 
whether . . . Oklahoma has moved too slowly or quickly in its efforts 
to restructure an entire industry.”40 Since these Acts were much more 
specific vis-à-vis the city’s conduct than the general statutory grant of 
                                                                                                                       
 31. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1112 (2015). 
 32. 647 F.3d at 1043. 
 33. Id. (“With its usual care Professor Areeda and Hovenkamp’s treatise traces all 
these warps and wefts . . . .”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 1044. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1045. 
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municipal powers pointed to by the city and the district court, no 
“clearly articulated” state policy to displace competition was present.41 
B.   Refusals to Deal 
 1.   Four Corners 
 The first of Judge Gorsuch’s refusal-to-deal opinions, Four Cor-
ners, was issued in 2009.42 Mercy Medical Center (Mercy), the de-
fendant, operated a hospital in Durango, Colorado, near a Southern 
Ute Indian reservation.43 Dr. Bevan, the plaintiff, operated a neph-
rology clinic in Farmington, New Mexico.44 Mercy and the Southern 
Ute Tribe attempted in vain for years to convince Dr. Bevan to pro-
vide inpatient services in Durango.45 Dr. Bevan consistently refused, 
though he held “consulting privileges” at Mercy.46 A second nephrolo-
gist, Dr. Saddler, agreed to relocate to Durango—but only on the 
condition that Mercy and the Tribe underwrite up to $2.5 million in 
losses to help launch the new practice.47   
 Under the hospital’s bylaws, hiring Dr. Saddler terminated Dr. 
Bevan’s consulting privileges.48 Dr. Bevan then applied for full admit-
tance but was rebuffed.49 To forestall further reapplications, Mercy 
and Dr. Saddler entered into an exclusive-supply contract.50 Mercy’s 
administrators reportedly preferred this arrangement for several in-
terrelated reasons. First, the hospital did not provide sufficient min-
imum scale to support two competing nephrologists.51 Second, as a 
result, the $2.5 million underwriting fund would be more rapidly de-
pleted by two competing nephrologists.52 Finally, Mercy was con-
cerned that Dr. Bevan would repeat a prior predation scheme he had 
                                                                                                                       
 41. Id. 
 42. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 43. Id. at 1217-18. 
 44. Id. at 1217. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1218. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. The hospital’s bylaws required all staff members to reside within a thirty-minute 
drive of the hospital.  Attempting to circumvent this requirement, Dr. Bevan “first suggest-
ed that he resided in Durango office space. When that gambit failed to persuade hospital 
authorities, he told Mercy he had leased a residence near Durango, which, on investigation, 
turned out to be a plot of vacant land.” Id. 
 50. Id. at 1218-19. 
 51. Id. at 1219. 
 52. Id. 
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(allegedly) carried out before.53 When a new nephrology practice 
opened in Page, Arizona, Dr. Bevan had launched a competing satel-
lite clinic.54 The town could not support two firms, and the rival prac-
tice soon exited the market, after which Dr. Bevan closed his clinic, 
leaving the town with no nephrologists at all.55 
 Judge Gorsuch, writing for a unanimous Tenth Circuit, ducked 
the thorny market-power issue on which the lower court decided the 
case. Instead, Gorsuch—citing Mercy’s answer brief—began by fram-
ing the case as a classic refusal to deal.56 With that as a starting 
point, Gorsuch engaged in a lengthy discussion of the rationale un-
derlying Trinko57 and Linkline,58 both recent U.S. Supreme Court de-
cisions that express skepticism of refusal-to-deal claims. With those 
markers staked, Gorsuch’s opinion admitted to some disagreement 
between the parties over how exactly to characterize the challenged 
conduct—as a refusal-to-deal, “monopoly-leveraging,” or essential-
facilities claim. That disagreement notwithstanding, Gorsuch ob-
served that “[i]n the end, picking an ‘epithet’ to fix on Dr. Bevan’s 
argument may be less illuminating than confronting its substance.”59 
 Gorsuch next reiterated that the “substance” of Dr. Bevan’s claim 
was a refusal to deal. A monopolist, under Trinko and Linkline, has 
no general “antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at all.”60 Gorsuch 
posited that antitrust plaintiffs can prevail on a refusal-to-deal claim 
only where a “key fact”—termination of a profitable course of dealing 
to achieve purely anticompetitive ends—is present.61 Since that fact 
was not present in Four Corners, the Tenth Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment for Mercy.62 
 Proceeding in dicta, the opinion also held that Dr. Bevan failed to 
allege antitrust injury. The trouble, per Gorsuch, arose when Dr. 
Bevan requested not only damages, but also injunctive relief in the 
form of court-ordered active medical-staff privileges.63 If the court 
were to order Mercy, a (putative) monopolist, simply to grant such 
privileges, there would be “no guarantee” that consumers would be 
                                                                                                                       
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1221. 
 57. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 58. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
 59. Four Corners, 582 F.3d at 1223. 
 60. Id. at 1221 (quoting Linkline, 555 U.S. at 1115) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. Id. at 1225 (citing Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 
1197 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
 62. Id. at 1225, 1227.  
 63. Id. at 1225-26. 
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better off.64 Mercy could simply charge Dr. Bevan monopoly prices, 
which would (presumably) be passed on to consumers.65 And mandat-
ing competitive terms along with access would, according to Gor-
such’s opinion, inappropriately turn the court into a central planner 
absent an “extensive past course of dealing” upon which the court 
could base such terms.66 As a result, Gorsuch concluded, Dr. Bevan 
did not suffer antitrust injury, for “a producer’s loss is no concern of 
the antitrust laws.”67 
 2.   Novell 
 The second of Judge Gorsuch’s refusal-to-deal opinions, Novell,68 
was issued in 2013, four years after Four Corners. The underlying 
suit was brought against Microsoft by Novell, the developer of Word-
Perfect. After an eight-week trial, the jury hung, and the district 
court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Microsoft.69 The 
appeal was argued before the Tenth Circuit by David Boies and Da-
vid Tulchin, both preeminent antitrust litigators. 
 The record—though voluminous—was, according to Judge Gor-
such, “straightforward enough.”70 During the 1990s, Microsoft’s Win-
dows operating system (OS) enjoyed a dominant market position.71 
Microsoft also sold an “office suite” of Windows-compatible software 
applications, including Word and Excel.72 Microsoft’s Word directly 
competed with Novell’s WordPerfect. Novell, in turn, aspired “to cre-
ate an office suite of its own to rival Microsoft Office.”73 Before rolling 
out the Windows 95 OS, Microsoft shared a beta version, as well as 
the application-programming interfaces (APIs), of Windows 95 with 
Novell and other software developers.74 This early access was sup-
posed to allow developers to create Windows-compatible applications 
without needing to spend months post-release writing custom code to 
                                                                                                                       
 64. Id. at 1226. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (“This isn’t to suggest that it’s always and metaphysically impossible to discern 
judicially administrable terms on which sharing might be mandated.”). 
 67. Id. (quoting Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(Easterbrook, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 69. Id. at 1066. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 1071. 
 72. Id. at 1067. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. (“Anticipating the release of Windows 95 to the public sometime in 1995, in 
June 1994 [Microsoft] shared a beta, or test, version of the operating system with [Inde-
pendent Software Vendors].”). 
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ensure compatibility. A wider variety of immediately available Win-
dows-compatible applications, in turn, “would help the marketing of 
Windows 95.”75 
 But Microsoft subsequently reversed course, withdrawing from 
Novell (and other developers) access to its Windows 95 APIs. The “ev-
idence suggest[ed]” that Microsoft withdrew access to make its “own 
applications, including Microsoft Office, more immediately attractive 
to users”76—even though the move “marginally reduce[d] the attrac-
tiveness of Microsoft’s new [OS].”77 
 Novell’s intuitive claim—monopolization of the “office-suite appli-
cations” market—was time-barred. Because the U.S. Justice De-
partment’s lawsuit against Microsoft in the 1990s tolled the statute 
of limitations for conduct in the OS market, Novell instead claimed 
that Microsoft’s conduct “helped Microsoft maintain its monopoly in 
the [OS] market.”78 More specifically, Novell argued that Microsoft’s 
conduct helped to lock users into Microsoft Office, and thereby into 
the Windows OS.79 Novell also argued that its PerfectOffice suite 
threatened Microsoft’s OS market share because other software de-
velopers could write applications “directly for PerfectOffice” instead 
of Windows.80 Such applications would make the choice underlying 
OS less salient for users, effectively commoditizing the OS market.81 
 Judge Gorsuch’s opinion begins by identifying the basic elements 
of any Sherman Act section 2 claim: monopoly power, anticompetitive 
conduct, and antitrust injury.82 Microsoft did not dispute that it pos-
sessed monopoly power during the relevant time period.83 Nonethe-
less, the Novell opinion devotes two paragraphs to a discussion of 
market definition and power. “[O]ne could well debate,” Gorsuch ob-
served, “whether the same product market that existed back then 
still exists today.”84 Indeed, Gorsuch went on to provide one side of 
that debate:  
                                                                                                                       
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 1068-69. 
 77. Id. at 1068. 
 78. Id. at 1069. 
 79. Id. at 1070. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See id. (“If PerfectOffice could perform more of the tasks traditionally performed 
by [OSs], more users would be inclined to ‘live in’ PerfectOffice rather than Windows. And 
because PerfectOffice was designed to work on other [OSs], these users too might be more 
easily enticed away from Windows.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1071. 
 84. Id. 
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Not infrequently, the quickly shifting gears of market innovation 
outstrip the slowly grinding gears of the law, and today Microsoft 
may face greater competition in providing [OSs] for personal com-
puters (think Apple, which now produces an Intel-compatible op-
erating system) and the personal computer itself may face more 
competition from other devices (think tablets and smartphones).85 
That said, since Microsoft had ceded the monopoly-power element to 
Novell, the discussion turned to—and ended with—the conduct inquiry. 
 The Novell opinion appears to endorse the “no economic sense” 
test for whether conduct violates section 2,86 with an additional (rela-
tively heavy) emphasis on the danger of false positives. “[T]he ques-
tion,” according to Gorsuch, “is whether . . . the conduct at issue be-
fore us has little or no value beyond the capacity to protect the mo-
nopolist’s market power—bearing in mind the risk of false positives 
(and negatives).”87 With that basic principle in mind, Gorsuch wrote, 
courts have fashioned particularized rules for common categories of 
conduct. 
 The applicable rule for “purely unilateral conduct”—as Gorsuch 
characterized Novell’s claim—is that such conduct “does not run 
afoul of section 2.”88 This general rule developed, according to Gor-
such, out of fear that forced access would encourage collusion, dis-
courage innovation, and turn courts into “central planners.”89 The 
rule is subject to a few exceptions. Gorsuch identified predatory pric-
ing as “a notable and easy example,” refusal to deal as a “somewhat 
more controversial example,” and the essential-facilities doctrine as 
“an even more controversial example.”90 
 Novell’s only path forward was through what Gorsuch colorfully 
labeled the “narrow-eyed needle of refusal to deal doctrine.”91 For a 
plaintiff to succeed under that doctrine, Gorsuch wrote, the requisite 
elements include “at least” (1) termination of a voluntary course of 
dealing, (2) that the termination entailed a short-run profit sacrifice, 
and (3) that the sacrifice was undertaken “to achieve an anti-
                                                                                                                       
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: 
The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413-14 (2006). 
 87. Novell, 731 F.3d at 1072. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 1073. 
 90. Id. at 1073-74. 
 91. Id. at 1074. 
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competitive end.”92 As to the third requirement, “the monopolist’s 
conduct must be irrational but for its anticompetitive effect.”93 
 Applying the first element was straightforward enough. Microsoft 
had voluntarily dealt with Novell (and other independent software 
developers) by offering them access to Microsoft’s OS APIs. Microsoft 
subsequently terminated that course of dealing. 
 Recognizing that the second element could draw an objection—
namely, that anticompetitive conduct need not be unprofitable, even 
in the short run—Gorsuch explained that the refusal-to-deal doctrine 
applies only to “a discrete category” of claims and “doesn’t seek to dis-
place doctrines that address a monopolist’s more direct interference 
with rivals.”94 Gorsuch also observed that the rule should be underin-
clusive rather than overinclusive, given the risk of false positives.95 
 With all of that in mind, Gorsuch turned to applying the second 
element. As to the OS market, it was “not clear” that Microsoft sacri-
ficed profits.96 Gorsuch pointed to evidence that Microsoft’s OS mar-
ket share grew after it launched Windows 95.97 He discounted testi-
mony from Novell’s CEO to the effect that Windows 95 would have 
“done even better” in the short run if a wider variety of compatible 
applications were available.98 Rather pointedly, Gorsuch observed 
that Novell’s expert witness had “refused to opine on the question.”99 
Finally, the opinion noted that Novell’s theory was in fact that Mi-
crosoft ultimately “helped its position in the [OSs] market.”100   
 Moreover, regardless of the actual effect on the OS market, the 
Tenth Circuit held that Novell still failed to show a short-run profit 
sacrifice. Microsoft’s conduct—even if it had caused short-run losses 
in the OS market—would have allowed Microsoft to recoup (some un-
specified amount of) those losses by selling additional office-suite ap-
plications.101 Gorsuch refused to consider disaggregating the two 
markets because, as he wrote, “[t]he point of the profit sacrifice test 
                                                                                                                       
 92. Id. at 1075 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. Id. at 1075. 
 94. Id. at 1075-76. 
 95. Id. at 1076 (“If the doctrine fails to capture every nuance, if it must err still to some 
slight degree, perhaps it is better that it should err on the side of firm independence . . . than 
on the other side . . . .”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1076-77. 
 99. Id. at 1077. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
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is to isolate conduct that has no possible efficiency justification,”102 
implying that Microsoft’s conduct was a “move[] that enhance[d] their 
overall efficiency, if at the expense of a particular business line.”103 
Since Novell did not meet the second element of Judge Gorsuch’s re-
fusal-to-deal doctrine, its section 2 claim failed. 
III.   PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION 
 At times, Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit antitrust jurisprudence displays 
a great deal of restraint. The Kay Electric opinion, in particular, con-
tains an elegantly narrow ruling that pays substantial deference to 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.104 At times, however, Gorsuch’s anti-
trust opinions subtly—but substantially—deviate from binding prec-
edent. Moreover, their reasoning occasionally falls into logical falla-
cies and relies upon an unduly one-sided error-cost framework. 
A.   Inconsistent Deference 
 Judge Gorsuch’s antitrust opinions exhibit a somewhat incon-
sistent deference to the Supreme Court. In Kay Electric, Gorsuch ex-
plicitly paid a great deal of deference to the Court. Gorsuch related 
the confusion over—and his personal dissatisfaction with—then-
current state-action precedent. He also observed his personal prefer-
ence for the “bright line rule” set forth by the venerable Areeda and 
Hovenkamp treatise.105 “But,” wrote Gorsuch, “however much sense 
this makes (and we think it makes quite a lot of sense), our lot as a 
lower court isn’t to choose between the Supreme Court’s holdings but 
to apply them.”106 
 Modern refusal-to-deal doctrine is unique in antitrust law. Before 
the Supreme Court’s Trinko opinion in 2004, refusal-to-deal claims 
were treated much like other Sherman Act section 2 claims. Trinko, 
however, expressed a great deal of skepticism for refusal-to-deal 
claims. The Court’s Linkline decision in 2009, which also involved (in 
part) a refusal to deal, reiterated much of the anti-interventionist 
language in Trinko. While the exact reach and requirements of Trinko 
and Linkline are less than clear, these opinions do seem to establish a 
relatively high bar for plaintiffs pursuing refusal-to-deal claims. 
                                                                                                                       
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. See infra Section II.A. 
 105. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2011); see also 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 225(a) (4th ed. 2017). 
 106. Kay Elec. Coop., 647 F.3d at 1043 (emphasis added). 
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 Only true refusal-to-deal claims should trigger this strict analysis. 
In his Four Corners opinion, Judge Gorsuch cast the plaintiff’s theory 
of harm as a refusal to deal, rather than exclusive dealing. Yet, as 
the following discussion explains, both the facts and the plaintiff’s 
court filings suggested that exclusive dealing—not refusal to deal—
was the proper categorization. This miscategorization of the relevant 
conduct activated a uniquely anti-interventionist body of Supreme 
Court precedent. It also allowed the Four Corners opinion to avoid 
applying more relevant (though less defendant-friendly) Supreme 
Court opinions.107 Four Corners thus stands as an example of what 
Gorsuch elsewhere decried: “choos[ing] between the Supreme Court’s 
holdings” instead of simply “apply[ing] them.”108 In effect, Four Cor-
ners expanded the scope of refusal-to-deal doctrine to encompass a 
broader variety of conduct.   
 Four years later, Novell expanded refusal-to-deal doctrine itself. 
As the following discussion reveals, Novell not only recast, but also 
added elements to, the standards established by the Supreme Court 
in previous refusal-to-deal cases. By the time Gorsuch penned the 
Novell opinion, the Court had already set relatively high barriers for 
plaintiffs attempting to bring refusal-to-deal cases. Novell raised 
those barriers higher still.   
 1.   Expansion of Refusal-to-Deal Doctrine: Miscategorizing Claims  
 In Four Corners, Judge Gorsuch found Dr. Bevan’s claim to be 
“analytically parallel to Trinko” because both plaintiffs “argued that 
a putative monopolist engaged in anticompetitive conduct by failing 
to provide a rival access to certain of its facilities.”109 This characteri-
zation activated the Supreme Court’s unusually defendant-friendly 
refusal-to-deal precedent. In particular, labeling Dr. Bevan’s claim a 
“refusal to deal” brought it under Trinko, in which Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, expressed skepticism of refusal-to-deal 
plaintiffs and praised the virtues of monopoly as an incentive for 
beneficial competition and innovation. 
 In Trinko, the “putative monopolist” was Verizon, an incumbent 
local exchange carrier (ILEC). Prior to 1996, Verizon enjoyed a gov-
ernment-granted monopoly over providing telephone services in New 
York. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, mandated that 
                                                                                                                       
 107. E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); see also United 
States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 108. Kay Elec. Coop., 647 F.3d at 1043. 
 109. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
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ILECs open their networks to competitive local exchange carriers 
(CLECs). The plaintiffs alleged that Verizon nonetheless withheld 
access to its telephone network from CLECs, violating section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. As Figure 1 illustrates, the “putative monopolist” (Ver-
izon) and the parties with whom that monopolist refused to deal (the 
CLECs) were, indeed, “rivals.” Verizon and CLECs competed head-to-
head for consumers’ business. Their relationship was horizontal. 
Figure 1 
 
Trinko thus presented as a classic refusal-to-deal case. The “monopo-
list” and the “victims” were horizontal marketplace competitors. The 
same was true of the “monopolist” and the “victim” in Aspen, the 
leading Supreme Court refusal-to-deal precedent prior to Trinko.110  
 But Dr. Bevan and Mercy, the plaintiff and defendant in Four Cor-
ners, were not horizontal “rivals.” Instead, Dr. Bevan (and Dr. Saddler, 
with whom Mercy entered into an exclusive contract) sought to supply 
nephrology services to Mercy. The relationship (or lack thereof) be-
tween Dr. Bevan and Mercy was vertical, as illustrated by Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
 
                                                                                                                       
 110. In Aspen, the leading U.S. Supreme Court decision on refusals to deal before Trin-
ko, the relationship was similar. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585 (1985). There, the plaintiff (Highlands) owned one of the four downhill-skiing 
facilities in Aspen, Colorado. Id. at 587-88. Highlands sued a “putative monopolist” (Ski 
Co.), alleging that Ski Co. anticompetitively refused to join Highlands in offering an “All-
Aspen ticket” that would allow skiers access to all of Highlands’ and Ski Co.’s facilities. Id. 
at 593-95. The relationship between the monopolist and the victim was that of marketplace 
competitors. 
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At a few points, the Four Corners opinion appeared to recognize this 
relationship—Gorsuch explained, for example, that “Mercy decided to 
preempt any future application from Dr. Bevan . . . by designating . . . 
Dr. Saddler . . . as the sole provider of . . .  services to the hospital.”111 
As this quote suggests, the “monopolist” (or, more appropriately, the 
“monopsonist”) and the “victim” in Four Corners were not horizontal 
rivals. 
 If Dr. Bevan was not pursuing a refusal-to-deal claim, what was 
the theory of his case? Even a cursory reading of Dr. Bevan’s com-
plaint reveals that it did not allege a refusal to deal, but rather “ex-
clusive dealing.” Both the complaint and Dr. Bevan’s appellate briefs 
are replete with references to the “exclusive contract” and the “exclu-
sive arrangement” between Mercy and Dr. Saddler.112 This was no 
mere exercise in creative pleading: as the foregoing illustrates, the 
facts of the case itself strongly suggest an exclusive-dealing theory, 
not a refusal to deal. 
 Exclusive dealing, which interferes with horizontal interbrand 
competition, is generally thought to pose a greater potential for anti-
competitive harm than a refusal to deal.113 Exclusive dealing also 
presents relatively less serious administrability concerns. Remedying 
a refusal to deal generally requires forced sharing, which—as Gor-
such noted in both Four Corners and Novell—carries the risk of 
court-facilitated collusion between horizontal rivals. It also places a 
court in the awkward role of “central planner,” particularly where 
there is no prior course of dealing after which a court could craft its 
remedial terms.114 But exclusive-dealing claims, which are vertical in 
nature, do not present the risk of facilitating horizontal collusion. 
And exclusive dealing is relatively easy to remedy: a court can simply 
enjoin the exclusive deal, rather than mandate a “new” deal. As a re-
sult, exclusive-dealing doctrine is relatively plaintiff-friendly, while 
refusal-to-deal doctrine is relatively defendant-friendly. 
 By miscategorizing the plaintiff’s theory as a “refusal to deal,” the 
Four Corners opinion activated and applied an inappropriate body of 
                                                                                                                       
 111. 582 F.3d at 1218-19 (emphasis added). 
 112. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellant at 29, Four Corners, 582 F.3d (No. 08-1231) 
(“Mercy changed its agreement with Dr. Saddler to an exclusive contract, so that no other 
nephrologists can practice at Mercy without Dr. Saddler’s permission. . . . This action cre-
ated a complete barrier to entry and blocked access to Mercy for Dr. Bevan . . . .”); see also 
Complaint at 18, Four Corners, 582 F.3d (No. 08-1231) (“By entering into an exclusive con-
tract with Dr. Saddler and denying Dr. Bevan . . . active medical staff privileges . . . [Mercy] 
has effectively excluded Dr. Bevan . . . from the nephrology physician services market.”).  
 113. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 105, ¶ 1800a (“[E]xclusive deal-
ing is said to be an ‘interbrand’ restraint in that it forbids the buyer of the defendant’s 
goods from purchasing similar goods from a rival as well.” (footnote omitted)). 
 114. See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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precedent. In essence, the miscategorization allowed the opinion to 
“choose between the Supreme Court’s holdings” instead of simply 
“apply[ing] them,”115 a practice Gorsuch condemned elsewhere.116   
 This categorical approach is all the more puzzling in light of the 
fact that the Four Corners opinion itself suggests a preference for a 
noncategorical approach to antitrust analysis. “In the end,” the opin-
ion observes, “picking an ‘epithet’ to fix on Dr. Bevan’s argument may 
be less illuminating than confronting its substance.”117 To be sure, the 
substance of Dr. Bevan’s argument was not compelling. Dr. Bevan’s 
past conduct strongly suggested his “interest” in actually expanding 
his practice to Durango was feigned and that he instead sought only 
to cause Dr. Saddler to exit the market.118 Mercy’s exclusive agree-
ment with Dr. Saddler likely caused no anticompetitive effects—on 
the contrary, it was likely procompetitive and welfare-enhancing. 
 The danger presented by the approach in Four Corners was not 
that it may have resulted in a discrete false negative; the outcome in 
that particular case was almost certainly correct. Rather, the danger 
lies in the over-expansion of refusal-to-deal doctrine, which was care-
fully crafted by the Supreme Court to apply only to a particular type 
of conduct.119 Almost any conduct by a monopolist could, following the 
lead of Four Corners, be labeled a “refusal to deal.” Predatory pricing, 
for example, could be viewed as “refusal to deal on the terms desired 
by the customer.” Tying could be viewed as “refusal to deal the tying 
product.” And so forth. But such linguistic gymnastics would subvert 
decades of antitrust doctrine and force non-refusal-to-deal plaintiffs to 
face higher bars than the Supreme Court has established. 
 Though Four Corners likely reached the correct outcome, it mis-
categorized the challenged conduct. The unique concerns presented 
by refusals to deal with a horizontal rival are not present in exclu-
sive-dealing cases, which are governed by a different body of case 
law. This miscategorization effectively nullified governing Supreme 
Court precedent and instead activated inapposite Supreme Court 
precedent. 
                                                                                                                       
 115. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 116. Id. at 1043. 
 117. Id. (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting 
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1989)). 
 118. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. 
 119. Elsewhere, Judge Gorsuch noted that the courts have, in fact, “develop[ed] . . . specif-
ic rules for common forms of alleged misconduct—like tying . . . exclusive dealing . . . or 
efforts to defraud or lie to regulators or consumers . . . .” Novell, 731 F.3d at 1072 (empha-
sis added). No similar passage appears in Four Corners. 
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 2.   Rewriting Trinko 
 In Novell (unlike in Four Corners), the court confronted a true re-
fusal to deal. Gorsuch’s opinion drew heavily from the Supreme 
Court’s Trinko opinion, which occupies a prominent position in the 
narrow area of refusal-to-deal doctrine. Critiquing Novell, then, re-
quires first understanding the backdrop against which it was decided. 
 Trinko was immediately, and has remained, controversial.120 Prior 
to Trinko, the leading case was Aspen, a 1985 opinion that recognized 
refusals to deal as a valid category of Sherman Act section 2 violations. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Trinko, recast the Aspen opin-
ion as lying “at or near the . . . boundary of [section] 2 liability.”121   
 Scalia distinguished the facts of Trinko from those of Aspen on 
three grounds. First, the defendant in Aspen had withdrawn from a 
voluntary cooperative venture with the plaintiff.122 But in Trinko, the 
defendant had never voluntarily dealt with its rivals; any relation-
ship(s) therewith were mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.123 Second, the defendant in Aspen had refused to deal “even if 
compensated at retail price,” thereby “reveal[ing] a distinctly anti-
competitive bent.”124 Again, that fact was lacking in Trinko.125 The 
third factor was, according to Justice Scalia, “more fundamental.”126 
In Trinko—unlike in Aspen127—the “services allegedly withheld 
[we]re not otherwise marketed or available to the public” until the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandated their production and 
availability.128 In other words, the relevant product itself was the re-
sult of regulation, not market forces. Scalia did not hold that those 
three grounds for distinguishing Aspen from Trinko were necessary 
elements of every refusal-to-deal claim. Given those three factors, 
however, Trinko fell outside the “boundary of [section] 2 liability.”129 
                                                                                                                       
 120. See, e.g., Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Is § 2 of the Sherman Act on Hold?, 
231 N.Y.L.J. 20 (Feb. 17, 2004) (“The [Trinko] decision was greeted with a collective wow 
by the Antitrust Bar . . . because of the potential consequences of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
sweeping majority opinion.”). 
 121. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 
(2004). 
 122. Id. at 409. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 409-10. 
 127. In this regard, Trinko was also unlike Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 
U.S. 366 (1973), a pre-Aspen decision that had validated a refusal-to-deal claim. 
 128. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410. 
 129. Id. at 409. 
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 In Novell, Novell (the plaintiff) and Microsoft (the defendant) 
competed horizontally in the office-suite applications market. The 
challenged conduct was not an exclusive deal between Microsoft and 
a third party (as was the case in Four Corners), but rather Microsoft’s 
termination of Novell’s access to Microsoft’s Windows APIs. Thus, 
Novell squarely implicated the Supreme Court’s Trinko and Aspen 
decisions. 
 As recast by Gorsuch in Novell, however, Justice Scalia’s carefully 
crafted Trinko opinion was distorted. Where Trinko had distin-
guished, Novell mandated. According to Novell, Scalia had held in 
Trinko that “there must be a preexisting voluntary and presumably 
profitable course of dealing between the monopolist and rival”130 for 
section 2 liability. Additionally, Gorsuch asserted (selectively quoting 
from Trinko) that “the monopolist’s discontinuation of the preexisting 
course of dealing must ‘suggest[] a willingness to forsake short-term 
profits to achieve an anti-competitive end’ ”131 for section 2 liability. 
Third, “the monopolist’s conduct must be irrational but for its anti-
competitive effect”132 for section 2 liability. 
 A side-by-side comparison of the two analyses reveals how strik-
ingly Novell departed from Trinko. 
Figure 3 
Trinko (distinguishing Aspen) Novell (mandating) 
• Defendant did not withdraw 
from a prior voluntary 
course of dealing. 
• Defendant did not refuse to 
deal even if compensated at 
retail prices. 
• Defendant’s product was not 
available absent regulatory 
compulsion. 
• Defendant must have with-
drawn from a prior volun-
tary course of dealing. 
• Defendant must have anti-
competitively forsaken 
short-term profits. 
• Defendant’s conduct must 
have been irrational but for 
its anticompetitive effect. 
 
The first two distinctions in Trinko became required elements of a 
plaintiff’s claim in Novell. In Trinko, Scalia had observed that the 
defendant’s “termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profit-
able) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term 
profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”133 But in Novell, Gor-
                                                                                                                       
 130. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
 131. Id. at 1075 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407). 
 132. Id. (emphasis added). 
 133. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (emphasis omitted). 
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such—selectively quoting from Trinko—declared that “the monopo-
list’s discontinuation of the preexisting course of dealing must ‘sug-
gest[] a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anti-
competitive end.’ ”134 The difference is subtle, but has the effect of 
subverting Justice Scalia’s sophisticated, case-specific reasoning. 
Scalia was merely noting multiple factors that distinguished the case 
at bar from Aspen—nowhere in the Trinko opinion does Scalia require 
that each of the factors be proven by every refusal-to-deal plaintiff. 
 Missing altogether from Novell was any analysis of the factor that 
Scalia had found most “fundamental” in Trinko: whether the alleged-
ly withheld product had ever been available absent regulatory com-
pulsion.135 Trinko, which involved an industry that previously had 
been heavily regulated but was undergoing substantial regulatory 
upheaval, presented a unique fact pattern. Scalia relied heavily on 
that unique factor in crafting a uniquely defendant-friendly opinion. 
But Novell involved the relatively unregulated software-applications 
industry. And access to Microsoft’s APIs had been “otherwise availa-
ble,” unlike the sought-after access in Trinko. By ignoring this factor, 
the Novell opinion expanded Trinko well beyond the metes and 
bounds established by Justice Scalia. It is unclear why Novell omit-
ted analysis of this factor; it may be worth noting that the factor 
would clearly have favored the plaintiff, Novell. 
 In place of the missing factor, Novell mandated an entirely new 
requirement: that the challenged conduct must have been economi-
cally irrational but for its anticompetitive effects (the “no economic 
sense” test). In support of this novel mandate, Gorsuch cited Aspen.136 
Yet a side-by-side comparison of Aspen and Novell reveals that this 
reliance was misplaced. 
Figure 4 
Aspen Novell 
“[A] company which possesses 
monopoly power and which . . . 
refuses to deal with a competitor 
in some manner does not violate 
Section 2 if valid business rea-
sons exist for that refusal.”137 
“Put simply, the monopolist’s con-
duct must be irrational but for its 
anticompetitive effect.”138 
                                                                                                                       
 134. Novell, 731 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis added). 
 135. 540 U.S. at 410. 
 136. The opinion cited, for additional support, Trinko, the Areeda and Hovenkamp 
treatise, and an academic article. 
 137. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985). 
 138. 731 F.3d at 1075. 
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 The Novell opinion declined to explore what the Aspen Court con-
templated in the passage above: whether “valid business reasons” 
justified the refusal to deal. Curiously, Novell lacks any discussion of 
the challenged conduct’s likely effects on consumers, in stark contrast 
to Gorsuch’s earlier opinion in Four Corners, which explored such 
effects at some length.139 
 This inattention to consumer welfare in Novell is surprising in 
light of the fact that Microsoft’s conduct had no discernible procom-
petitive justification, a fact that indicates a high likelihood of con-
sumer harm. In stark contrast to Mercy’s conduct in Four Corners, 
Microsoft’s conduct had the anticompetitive effect of reducing its own 
product’s quality and limiting consumer choice. Gorsuch himself rec-
ognized as much, noting that withdrawing access to APIs “reduce[d] 
the attractiveness of Microsoft’s new [OS].”140 
 At any rate, the Novell opinion effectively rewrote Supreme Court 
precedent by imposing the “no economic sense” requirement. Gorsuch 
rightly observed that “a monopolist can find ways to harm competi-
tion while still making money,”141 tacitly admitting that this novel 
requirement would likely yield false negatives and allow anticompeti-
tive conduct to escape liability. But he ultimately decided that the 
risk of false positives took precedence and justified imposing the 
heightened requirement. 
 In sum, Novell recast two of the three factors Scalia had used to 
distinguish Aspen as requirements. Novell ignored entirely the third, 
“more fundamental” factor. And Novell imposed a new requirement—
the “no economic sense” requirement—that was created out of whole 
cloth. 
 Even despite these newly heightened standards, the plaintiff’s 
case in Novell was fairly compelling. Microsoft and Novell had a pri-
or, voluntary course of dealing. Microsoft’s conduct had the effect of 
making its own OS less attractive to consumers, necessarily consti-
tuting a short-run profit sacrifice. And that conduct appeared irra-
tional but for its anticompetitive, exclusionary effect—certainly Mi-
crosoft did not allege any procompetitive justifications for withhold-
ing access. 
                                                                                                                       
 139. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Having made a substantial investment . . . Mercy is enti-
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 140. Novell, 731 F.3d at 1068. 
 141. Id. at 1075-76. 
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 Nonetheless, Gorsuch’s opinion managed—by employing fallacious 
arguments and misapplying its own standards—to reject the plain-
tiff’s claim. As to short-run profit sacrifice, Gorsuch found that even 
if Microsoft had sacrificed profits by reducing the quality of its own 
OS, the plaintiff nonetheless failed to satisfy the requirement.142 The 
“point” of the requirement, according to the Novell opinion, “is to iso-
late conduct that has no possible efficiency justification.”143 Yet Mi-
crosoft’s conduct may have allowed it to capture increased revenues 
from sales of its office suite. Gorsuch therefore credited Microsoft’s 
conduct as a “move[] that enhance[d] their overall efficiency, if at the 
expense of a particular business line.”144 As a result, the opinion con-
cluded, Microsoft’s conduct had an “efficiency justification” and did 
not constitute a profit sacrifice. 
 This reasoning commits a common logical fallacy. Restated as a 
syllogism, Novell’s argument was as follows: 
1. Microsoft’s conduct caused it to sacrifice profits from OS sales. 
2. Microsoft’s conduct allowed it to recoup some of those sacrificed 
profits via additional applications sales. 
3. Microsoft did not sacrifice profits. 
The fallacy—that of an undistributed middle145—is readily apparent. 
Even if the “short-run profit sacrifice” requirement espoused by Gor-
such were consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the test appears 
to have been satisfied in this case. The fact that Microsoft recouped 
some profits should not have doomed the plaintiff’s claim. 
 It also bears emphasizing that, from a decision-theoretic stand-
point, the profit-sacrifice requirement as applied in Novell is mas-
sively, and unduly, one-sided. Under the reasoning of Novell, a plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving not only that the defendant’s conduct 
entailed a short-run profit sacrifice in the relevant market, but also 
that the defendant failed to recoup any of its lost revenues in any re-
lated market(s). That burden would often be—as the defendant-
friendly outcome of Novell suggests—impossible to satisfy.146 
                                                                                                                       
 142. Id. at 1076. 
 143. Id. at 1077. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See generally John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2018) (manuscript at 10 n.57), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2827277 (explaining the fallacy of the undistributed middle). 
 146. In that sense, it is similar to the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 205-07 (2d Cir. 2016). There, as in Novell, the appel-
late court deviated from long-standing Supreme Court precedent regarding market defini-
tion in two-sided platform markets. And, again as in Novell, the opinion requires the plain-
tiff not only to prove the elements of its own case (in American Express, that the defendant 
 
2017]  ANTITRUST: NEIL GORSUCH 247 
 
 As to the “no economic sense” test, Novell went astray in its appli-
cation. Contrary to Gorsuch’s holding, Microsoft’s conduct was almost 
certainly not efficient. Microsoft offered no procompetitive justifica-
tion for its actions.147 The evidence indicated that Microsoft’s conduct 
was intended to, and did in fact, disadvantage its rivals and ad-
vantage its own products in the office-suite applications market.148 
But that advantage was not alleged to be the result of competition on 
the merits. In fact, there was evidence suggesting that “Microsoft was 
concerned that if [access] were not withheld . . . Word and Excel 
would have to ‘battle against their competitors on even turf.’ ”149 Mi-
crosoft, in other words, undertook to avoid competition on the merits. 
Where a monopolist is able to recapture (some) of the lost profits 
caused by reducing its own product quality via sales of a complemen-
tary product—sales that would not have occurred in a competitive 
environment—that result cannot be said to be “efficient.”150 It repre-
sents an allocative inefficiency. 
 In short, Novell committed the fundamental error of mistaking an 
anticompetitive effect for an efficiency. The increase in Microsoft’s ap-
plications sales volume (and market share) was the inefficient result of 
exclusion—an anticompetitive effect—not the efficient result of compe-
tition on the merits. Microsoft’s conduct decreased the attractiveness of 
its own OS, but increased the market share of its applications by ex-
cluding Novell (and others). That conduct should therefore have 
passed the “no economic sense” requirement: it was irrational but for 
                                                                                                                                       
had the power to control price and output vis-à-vis its merchant customers) but also to 
disprove a mere possibility raised by the defendant (in American Express, that any price 
increases to merchants may have been passed through to cardholders in the form of re-
wards programs). See id. at 205-07. To the extent it is relevant, the Author represented the 
United States in United States v. American Express. This Essay does not reveal any confi-
dential information and does not represent the views of the United States in that or any 
other matter. 
 147. More precisely, Microsoft attempted to show procompetitive justifications for its 
conduct, but the trial court held that a reasonable jury could have found that those justifi-
cations were pretextual. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:04-cv-01045-JFM, 2012 WL 
2913234, at *15 (D. Utah July 16, 2012). On appeal from a grant of judgment as a matter of 
law, the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thus, 
for purposes of analyzing the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, Microsoft offered no valid procompet-
itive justifications. 
 148. Novell, 731 F.3d at 1069 (quoting, from the trial record, an email from Bill Gates 
to that effect). 
 149. Novell, 2012 WL 2913234, at *3 (quoting from a Novell exhibit). 
 150. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES § 6.1, at 20 (2010) (“A merger between firms selling differentiated products may di-
minish competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price 
of one or both products above the pre-merger level. Some of the sales lost due to the price 
rise will merely be diverted to the product of the merger partner and, depending on relative 
margins, capturing such sales loss through merger may make the price increase profitable 
even though it would not have been profitable prior to the merger.”). 
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its anticompetitive effect. Thus, Novell not only created a novel re-
quirement; it went on to misapply its own test. 
 Following its issuance in 2004, the Trinko decision was immediate-
ly criticized for its defendant-friendly rhetoric151 and what some viewed 
as an inappropriate deference to the principle of stare decisis.152 The 
actual holding of Trinko was, however, fairly narrow.153 Gorsuch’s 
opinion in Novell expanded on, and deviated from, Justice Scalia’s 
carefully crafted Trinko opinion. Despite all of that, the plaintiff in 
Novell appeared to be on fairly solid footing. Nonetheless, the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion pulled the rug out from under Novell’s feet by apply-
ing an extreme variant of the profit-sacrifice test that was, effective-
ly, impossible to meet. Under Novell’s reasoning, a plaintiff may 
manage to satisfy the “prior course of dealing” requirement and prove 
that the defendant engaged in inefficient conduct that caused anti-
competitive harm to consumers—yet nonetheless fail even to reach a 
jury, even where the defendant failed to offer any procompetitive jus-
tification for its actions. Such a result is untenable in light of lower 
courts’ duty to faithfully apply Supreme Court precedent; it is also 
untenable in light of the modern consensus view that antitrust law is 
meant to safeguard competition and maximize consumer welfare. 
B.   Departure from Antitrust-Injury Doctrine:  
Double-Counting Error Costs 
 The “antitrust-injury” doctrine was developed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court to ensure that antitrust law protects the competitive 
process itself, rather than particular competitors. More specifically, 
requiring plaintiffs to show antitrust injury has the salutary effect of 
weeding out claims brought by competitors upset about competi-
tion—for example, a lower-cost product being offered by a more effi-
cient rival—and not about anticompetitive conduct, the appropriate 
target of the antitrust laws.   
                                                                                                                       
 151. E.g., Robert A. Jablon et al., Trinko and Credit Suisse Revisited: The Need for 
Effective Administrative Agency Review and Shared Antitrust Responsibility, 34 ENERGY 
L.J. 627, 635-36 (2013) (“[I]n spite of its narrow holding, the Court’s expansive dicta sug-
gests that at least in some circumstances courts may adopt a diminished antitrust en-
forcement role in regulated industries, thereby failing to protect competition. Because the 
Court’s dicta is largely based on flawed assumptions, it would be most unfortunate for 
American consumers and the place of antitrust law as the ‘Magna Carta of free enterprise’ 
if these concerns are allowed to prove valid.”). 
 152. E.g., Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years of Access 
Denials, 27 ANTITRUST 50 (2012) (“[T]he distinction commonly offered, that the conduct at 
issue in Aspen involved a break from a prior course of dealing while Trinko did not, is a 
distinction that is . . . inconsistent with other Supreme Court precedent . . . .”). 
 153. E.g., Jablon et al., supra note 151, at 638. 
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 The leading Supreme Court decision is Brunswick.154 At issue was 
a firm’s acquisitions of several failing bowling alleys. According to the 
plaintiffs, who operated rival bowling alleys, the defendant’s more 
efficient size would have allowed it to profitably operate the formerly 
failing facilities.155 The resulting competitive pressure would have 
reduced plaintiffs’ profits. In other words, the plaintiffs were seeking 
redress for “harm” caused by competition, the very “harm” antitrust 
laws are designed to encourage.156 The Court roundly rejected this 
theory, holding that antitrust plaintiffs must prove injury “of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent,” i.e., injury caused by 
anticompetitive conduct.157 
 Properly understood, then, the Supreme Court’s antitrust-injury 
doctrine is about types of harm. If a plaintiff’s theory of the case 
hinges on the wrong type of harm (harm from competition), the case 
should be dismissed. Only cases that involve the correct type of harm 
(harm from anticompetitive conduct) should proceed.   
 It follows that the antitrust-injury doctrine is not about ability to 
remedy harm. The Brunswick Court was not concerned about wheth-
er an effective remedy could be crafted in that or any other case. The 
supposed “harm” alleged in Brunswick may well have been remedia-
ble—the Brunswick plaintiffs sought, for example, an injunction 
against future acquisitions by the defendant, which would have been 
relatively straightforward for a court to issue.158 Instead, the Court 
was concerned with preventing recovery by plaintiffs who suffered 
the wrong type of losses—“losses which are of no concern to the anti-
trust laws.”159 
 In Four Corners, however, Gorsuch applied a starkly different an-
titrust-injury requirement, one that would have been unrecognizable 
to the Brunswick Court. According to Gorsuch’s opinion, the plaintiff, 
                                                                                                                       
 154. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 155. Id. at 479-80. 
 156. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (1984) 
(“The plaintiff in Brunswick . . . complained that the acquisition kept in the market bowl-
ing emporiums that otherwise would have failed, thus diverting business from its lanes to 
Brunswick’s and producing lower prices.”). 
 157. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). Particular anticompetitive effects 
that can generally serve as the basis for a finding of antitrust injury “include higher prices 
(i.e., overcharges), reduced output, lower quality, or less innovation.” John M. Newman, 
Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49, 58 (2016). 
 158. 429 U.S. at 480-81. 
 159. Id. at 487. In fact, the Brunswick Court could be said to have been even more con-
cerned with the fact that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a statutory violation alto-
gether—consider, for example, the following passage: “[T]he antitrust laws are not merely 
indifferent to the injury claimed here.” Id. at 488. The Court also refused to order a new 
trial on the damages claim, citing the “rather unimpressive” evidence of anticompetitive 
conduct. Id. at 490 n.15. 
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Dr. Bevan, failed to prove antitrust injury for two (related) reasons. 
First, “even if we were to force Mercy to accommodate Dr. Bevan’s 
demand, the hospital could simply impose [monopolistic] costs and 
conditions on Dr. Bevan’s activities.”160 Second, preventing that out-
come would have been a “difficult[]” task for the court.161 
 The error in this line of reasoning is readily apparent. A faithful 
application of Supreme Court precedent would have entailed analyz-
ing the type of harm alleged by Dr. Bevan—yet that analysis is lack-
ing altogether from the antitrust-injury portion of the Four Corners 
opinion. Instead, the focus was exclusively on judicial ability to 
remedy harm.   
 In support of this incongruous notion of “antitrust injury,” Four 
Corners relied on inapposite sources. As to the first prong of reason-
ing (the market could achieve a monopolistic equilibrium whether or 
not Dr. Bevan had access to Mercy’s facilities), the Four Corners 
opinion cited a passage from the Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise.162 
Yet the quoted passage is from a portion of the treatise that address-
es the requirements for establishing that a unilateral refusal to deal 
is exclusionary—not the requirements for proving antitrust injury.163   
 As to the second prong (remedying the challenged conduct would 
be a difficult judicial task), the Four Corners opinion first cited a pas-
sage of the Supreme Court’s Linkline decision, which in turn quoted 
Trinko: “Courts are ill suited ‘to act as central planner, identifying 
the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing.’ ”164 But in nei-
ther Linkline nor Trinko was the Supreme Court discussing the anti-
trust-injury doctrine. Instead, both cases were—like the passage 
from the Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise—addressing the require-
ments for establishing that a refusal to deal is exclusionary.165 In 
fact, neither the majority opinion in Linkline nor the majority opinion 
in Trinko166 mentioned “antitrust injury” at all. 
                                                                                                                       
 160. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216, 1226 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 105, ¶ 773. 
 164. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009) (quoting 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)). 
 165. Leslie observes an analogous move by Judge Easterbrook vis-à-vis predatory-
pricing doctrine: “Judge Easterbrook converted Matsushita’s observation about the difficul-
ty of recoupment into a requirement that plaintiffs must prove recoupment in section 2 
predatory pricing cases.” Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2013). 
 166. Justice Stevens, who wrote a separate Trinko opinion concurring in the judgment, 
would have disposed of the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that the plaintiff was an indi-
rect purchaser of Verizon’s services. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416-18 (Stevens, J., concurring 
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 The opinion in Four Corners thus provides another example of 
“choos[ing] between the Supreme Court’s holdings” instead of “ap-
ply[ing] them.”167 It is Brunswick, not Linkline or Trinko, that sup-
plies the appropriate antitrust-injury precedent. The Tenth Circuit’s 
proper task was to faithfully apply Brunswick to the issue of anti-
trust injury. It failed to carry out that task.168 
 Moreover, by misapplying Linkline and Trinko to craft a novel an-
titrust-injury requirement, the Four Corners opinion committed at 
least two additional errors. First, the Four Corners rule (especially if 
used with the heightened requirements of Novell) double-counts error 
costs. Second, it fails to contemplate or address claims seeking dam-
ages, despite the fact that the very claim before the Tenth Circuit 
requested damages. 
 In Four Corners, Gorsuch—as he did later in Novell, and as did 
the Supreme Court in Linkline and Trinko—used an error-cost 
framework to inform the inquiry into whether a unilateral refusal to 
deal was anticompetitive. Specifically, Gorsuch expressed substantial 
concern regarding the risk of false positives, i.e., wrongly condemning 
innocent conduct. After noting the “general rule” that a monopolist 
has no duty to deal with rivals, Gorsuch’s opinion posits that “[t]his 
presumption should hardly surprise”—after all, “[t]o deny the [mo-
nopolist’s] payoff is to deter the [procompetitive] investment.”169 
Trinko likewise expressed concern about false positives,170 as did 
Linkline.171 It is the risk of false positives that, according to all three 
                                                                                                                                       
in the judgment). Justice Stevens offhandedly mentioned “antitrust injury” once, but would 
not have decided the case on antitrust-injury grounds. Id. at 417 (“[I]t remains the case 
that whatever antitrust injury respondent suffered because of Verizon’s conduct was purely 
derivative of the injury that AT&T suffered.”). 
 167. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 168. Again, the present argument is not meant to address the merits of Dr. Bevan’s 
claim. On the record, it appears that Dr. Bevan did not suffer any injury-in-fact (given the 
pretextual appearance of his alleged desire to actually open a long-term practice in Duran-
go) and/or that Mercy had valid procompetitive justifications for its conduct. But, as the 
leading treatise explains: 
To say that the plaintiff has not alleged or shown any injury-in-fact requires 
dismissal on grounds of causation or lack of injury.  To say that the plaintiff 
has not shown any injury to competition is to conclude that the antitrust laws 
have not been violated at all.  Neither of these is “antitrust injury” in the sense 
that Brunswick used the term, where the Court assumed both injury-in-fact 
and an antitrust violation. 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 105, ¶ 337a. 
 169. Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 
1216, 1221-22 (2009). 
 170. 540 U.S. at 414 (noting the “problem of false positives”). 
 171. Linkline dealt with a “price squeeze” claim. As to the wholesale-pricing aspect of 
the “squeeze,” the Court straightforwardly applied Trinko. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline 
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cases, justifies the uniquely heightened requirements for proving 
that a unilateral refusal to deal is exclusionary. 
 But the Four Corners opinion goes on to invoke the same error 
costs a second time, in the antitrust-injury context. While the risk of 
false positives is real, a given claim presents a given amount of 
risk.172 Justice Scalia, writing for the Trinko majority, accounted for 
that risk by minimizing Aspen, effectively raising the bar for plain-
tiffs.173 A plaintiff pursuing a unilateral-refusal-to-deal theory must, 
like all section 2 plaintiffs, prove monopoly power, anticompetitive 
conduct, and antitrust injury. The Supreme Court bolstered the con-
duct requirement to account for what the unique risk of error costs 
presented by refusal-to-deal plaintiffs. Four Corners, however, count-
ed those error costs yet again en route to fashioning its novel anti-
trust-injury rule. 
 Moreover, the Four Corners opinion fell into a logical fallacy by 
failing to address claims seeking damages. Restated in syllogistic 
form, its antitrust-injury argument ran as follows: 
1. Dr. Bevan requests damages and forced access to Mercy’s facili-
ties absent a prior voluntary course of dealing. 
2. A plaintiff who requests forced access to the defendant’s facili-
ties absent a prior voluntary course of dealing fails to prove an-
titrust injury.  
3. Dr. Bevan did not prove antitrust injury. 
Like Novell, the Four Corners opinion commits the fallacy of the un-
distributed middle. The minor premise does not dispose of the entire-
ty of the major premise. Even if refusal-to-deal claims seeking injunc-
                                                                                                                                       
Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 449 (2009). As to retail prices, the Court observed that “mis-
taken inferences are ‘especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust 
laws are designed to protect.’ ” Id. at 451 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)). 
 172. That risk is not compounded by adding the antitrust-injury requirement. As 
Brunswick illustrates, antitrust injury is a relatively straightforward concept, one that 
does not require a complex set of potentially difficult-to-administer rules. Even as early as 
1984, Easterbrook’s seminal article on error costs was able to identify at least ten appellate 
decisions applying the antitrust-injury requirement to weed out baseless competitor law-
suits. See Easterbrook, supra note 156, at 35-39.  If there were obvious contrary examples 
of courts mis-applying the requirement, one would expect Easterbrook—who was a great 
deal more concerned about false positives than false negatives—to identify and roundly 
criticize them. But the article only observes, without supporting citations, that “there are 
contrary holdings,” id. at 37 n.78, and that “plaintiffs seem to get away with” such law-
suits, id. at 38. For an argument that concern about baseless competitor lawsuits (and 
baseless agency enforcement actions supposedly incited by competitors) is overstated, see 
Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with An-
titrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 27 (2015) (“This concern states what is at best an im-
plausible hypothesis.”). 
 173. 540 U.S. at 414. 
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tive relief necessarily fail to satisfy the antitrust-injury require-
ment—a faintly ludicrous proposition—Dr. Bevan’s complaint also 
sought damages. And damages as a remedy are not subject to the 
same concerns regarding judicial administrability. 
 This antitrust-injury jurisprudence is troubling. It reveals an ef-
fectively, if perhaps unconsciously, inconsistent deference to the Su-
preme Court—i.e., “choos[ing] between the Supreme Court’s hold-
ings”174 instead of applying them. If the antitrust-injury inquiry loses 
its focus on harm, it will fail to perform its doctrinal role; a role that 
is almost universally heralded as welfare-enhancing.175 Moreover, 
altering antitrust-injury requirements based on administrability con-
cerns, where those concerns have already been addressed elsewhere, 
effectively double-counts error costs, systematically and suboptimally 
skewing outcomes.176 
C.   Façade of Neutrality 
 The error-cost framework that underlies much of Justice Gor-
such’s antitrust jurisprudence is supposed to be a “neutral economic 
tool.”177 Awareness of error costs was at the center of the modern rev-
olution in antitrust law. That revolution did much to rationalize anti-
trust doctrine. Yet, as demonstrated by the discussion of antitrust 
injury above, the error-cost framework can also be manipulated to 
produce certain outcomes. Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit antitrust opinions 
suggest at least two additional areas for improvement vis-à-vis error-
cost analysis. 
 1.   False Positives (Always) Trump False Negatives 
 Error-cost-based antitrust analyses have recently come under crit-
icism for “systematically overstat[ing] the incidence and significance 
of false positives,” while simultaneously “understat[ing] the incidence 
and significance of false negatives.”178 Much of the trouble springs 
from a time-inconsistent application of the error-cost framework.179  
Before the Modern Era of antitrust (which is generally supposed to 
                                                                                                                       
 174. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 175. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 172, at 26 (“In the judgment of Herbert Hovenkamp, a 
leading mainstream antitrust commentator, ‘while anticompetitive decisions were once 
relatively common, they are much less frequent today.’ ” (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 71 (2005)). 
 176. For an argument that the error-cost framework—which is, in theory, neutral—
already unduly favors antitrust defendants, see Baker, supra note 172. 
 177. Id. at 2. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 37 (“[T]oday’s antitrust conservatives . . . sound[] at times as though neither 
antitrust law nor antitrust economics has changed since the late 1970s . . . .”). 
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have begun in 1979 with the Supreme Court’s GTE Sylvania180 deci-
sion181), the risk of false positives was relatively far greater, and the 
risk of false negatives lower, than those risks are today.182 
 Some of this evolution entailed raising the bar for proving that 
particular types of conduct are anticompetitive. Thus, for example, 
the Supreme Court in 2007 overruled one of the last remaining deci-
sions mandating per se illegality for vertical restraints of trade, im-
posing instead the relatively difficult-to-satisfy requirements of the 
rule of reason.183 Some of the evolution is due also to refining non-
conduct requirements for plaintiffs to succeed—for example, the 
Court’s Brunswick decision imposing the antitrust-injury require-
ment. And some of the evolution is due to heightened pleading stand-
ards184 and impediments to class-action litigation.185 
 Taken together, these developments alter—or at least ought to 
alter—the balance of error costs substantially. One recent study of 
rule-of-reason cases decided during 1999-2009, for example, revealed 
that modern “plaintiffs almost never win under the rule of reason.”186 
During that decade, defendants won 221 of 222 rule-of-reason cas-
es.187 Similarly, an exhaustive recent meta-analysis of merger retro-
spectives concluded that, as to “close call” mergers, “agency decisions 
regarding challenges appear too tolerant. Simply put, many mergers 
that result in price increases are cleared.”188 
 Yet, where Gorsuch’s antitrust jurisprudence explicitly employs 
an error-cost decisional framework, those costs are uniformly pre-
sumed to disfavor enforcement and favor defendants. The Novell de-
cision contains Gorsuch’s most extended discussion of error costs. 
Consider the following passage, which frames the basic task of judi-
cially analyzing section 2 claims:  
[T]he question we often find ourselves asking is whether, based on 
the evidence and experience derived from past cases, the conduct 
                                                                                                                       
 180. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 181. E.g., Lindsey M. Edwards & Joshua D. Wright, The Death of Antitrust Safe Har-
bors: Causes and Consequences, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1205 (2016). 
 182. Baker, supra note 172, at 26. 
 183. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) 
(overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)). 
 184. E.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986). 
 185. E.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 186. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009). 
 187. Id. 
 188. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 159 (2015). 
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at issue before us has little or no value beyond the capacity to pro-
tect the monopolist’s market power—bearing in mind the risk of 
false positives (and negatives) any determination on the question of 
liability might invite, and the limits on the administrative capaci-
ties of courts to police market terms and transactions.189 
The subtle use of parentheses to minimize false negatives is telling. 
And, indeed, the Novell opinion goes on to identify several risks of 
false positives without again discussing or even mentioning false 
negatives.190 Most explicitly, the opinion later buttresses the argu-
ment in favor of its extreme form of the short-run-profit-sacrifice and 
no-economic-sense requirements as follows: “If the doctrine fails to 
capture every nuance . . . it should err on the side of firm independ-
ence—given its demonstrated value to the competitive process and 
consumer welfare—[rather] than . . . face the risk of inducing collu-
sion and inviting judicial central planning.”191 
 It may well be that unilateral refusal-to-deal cases present some 
unique error costs, though Professor Hovenkamp persuasively sug-
gests that calculus is altered in networked markets lacking Trinko’s 
heavy regulatory backdrop.192 But a blindered focus on false positives 
will tend to produce inefficient, welfare-reducing outcomes. The dou-
ble-counting of false positives noted above exacerbates this problem. 
Error-cost analysis should be a “neutral economic tool,”193 not a basis 
for scaling back antitrust enforcement ad infinitum. 
 2.   Predatory Pricing as “A Notable and Easy Example” 
 Today, successful Sherman Act section 2 cases are relatively ra-
re.194 Section 2 claims that challenge “purely unilateral conduct,” a 
category that includes refusals to deal, face an even steeper uphill 
battle than other section 2 claims. But, as the Supreme Court pointed 
                                                                                                                       
 189. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 190.  Id.  
 191. Id. at 1076. 
 192. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1642 (2010). 
 193. Baker, supra note 172, at 2. 
 194. Public enforcement of section 2, which targets monopolistic conduct, is exceedingly 
rare. Between 2006 and 2015, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice did not file a 
single contested complaint alleging a section 2 violation. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORK-
LOAD STATISTICS FY 2007-2016, at 5, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download 
[https://perma.cc/JP7Q-2XWG] (last visited Sept. 5, 2017). The Department of Justice did 
file one complaint during that time period; that complaint was resolved via consent decree. 
See United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-CV-00030-O, 2011 WL 
11544325 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2011). 
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out in Linkline, “there are rare instances in which a dominant firm 
may incur antitrust liability for purely unilateral conduct.”195 
 Writing for the Tenth Circuit in Novell, Gorsuch echoed this lan-
guage. Novell, however, went on to create a hierarchy of those “rare” 
instances. “Predatory pricing,” Gorsuch began, “presents a notable 
and easy example.”196 Refusals to deal are “another if somewhat more 
controversial example.”197 And “[e]ssential facilities doctrine offers 
perhaps an even more controversial example.”198   
 The implication seems to be that predatory-pricing claims are (at 
least relative to other unilateral section 2 claims) notably easy for 
plaintiffs to bring and win. This, in part, provided the normative jus-
tification for Novell’s unusually hostile treatment of refusals to 
deal—other avenues (or at least one other avenue) remain open to 
antitrust plaintiffs harmed by unilateral monopolistic conduct.199 But 
is that the case? 
 In 1993, the Supreme Court’s Brooke Group decision explicitly im-
posed a new requirement for plaintiffs bringing predatory-pricing 
claims: such plaintiffs must prove that the defendant will likely re-
cover its losses stemming from the predation period by charging su-
pracompetitive prices in the future.200 The Court was explicitly moti-
vated to impose this requirement by the fear of false positives.201 (It 
failed to mention the costs of false negatives.) This new “recoupment 
requirement” single-handedly “effectively eliminated the viability of 
predatory pricing claims.”202 
 Today, with Brooke Group in place, predatory pricing does not, 
under any reasonable interpretation of those two words, present a 
“notable and easy example” of section 2 liability. At a bare minimum, 
then, Novell’s unsupported reference to predatory pricing as such was 
descriptively incorrect. A fortiori, the reference can be viewed as an-
other example of time-inconsistent and one-sided analysis. It sug-
                                                                                                                       
 195. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009). 
 196. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 197. Id. at 1074. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 1073 (suggesting that predatory pricing is a “notable and easy example” 
of antitrust law addressing the “most glaring” instances of harmful unilateral conduct). 
 200. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1993). 
 201. Id. at 226 (“[T]he costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high.”). 
 202. Leslie, supra note 165, at 1698-99. Even Crane, writing in defense of the height-
ened predatory-pricing standards in 2005, identifies only two examples of plaintiffs suc-
ceeding at trial on predatory-pricing claims after 1993. Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of 
Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (2005). 
2017]  ANTITRUST: NEIL GORSUCH 257 
 
gests a worldview in which “neither antitrust law nor antitrust eco-
nomics has changed since the late 1970s.”203   
 This line of reasoning also subtly, but effectively, double-counts 
(again) the error costs of false positives. As of 2013, when Novell was 
issued, the Supreme Court had already imposed unique rules in the 
areas of predatory-pricing and refusals to deal. The Court’s height-
ened standards were explicitly designed to compensate for any 
unique risks of false positives posed by such cases. Novell situated 
refusals to deal in the middle of an error-cost-based hierarchy of uni-
lateral conduct. According to this hierarchy, refusals to deal present 
greater error costs (which, under this view, equate solely the risks of 
false positives) than predatory pricing. Drawing on this hierarchy as 
a normative justification, Novell went on to impose a burden on re-
fusal-to-deal plaintiffs even higher than that imposed by the Su-
preme Court. Yet the Court had already “counted” the risk of false 
positives in Trinko and Brooke Group. Novell appears to have count-
ed that risk yet again.204 
IV.   SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 
 Justice Gorsuch’s antitrust jurisprudence exhibits (perhaps un-
surprisingly, in light of his extensive experience) a relatively sophis-
ticated understanding and application of antitrust doctrine. Kay 
Electric, in particular, is a model of judicial restraint and elegant 
reasoning. (Indeed, the Supreme Court cited Kay Electric approvingly 
in its Phoebe Putney decision.205) As a jurist, Gorsuch appears to em-
brace the modern consensus view that antitrust law is meant to safe-
guard competition and maximize consumer welfare, a view that has 
done much to rationalize antitrust law. 
 The foregoing discussion does, however, reveal some areas for im-
provement. The following suggestions briefly summarize the norma-
tive implications of that discussion. While these suggestions reflect 
the particular issues discussed in Part III, they also are generally 
applicable—all antitrust jurists would do well to apply them. 
A.   Not All Unilateral Conduct Is a “Refusal to Deal” 
 The Supreme Court’s refusal-to-deal doctrine has been refined 
over the course of decades to address a particular type of conduct: a 
                                                                                                                       
 203. Baker, supra note 172, at 37. 
 204. This cycle could foreseeably continue until Sherman Act section 2 claims become 
(truly) impossible to win. After raising the bar for refusal-to-deal plaintiffs (as did Novell), 
one might argue that predatory-pricing claims had become relatively too “easy” to win, 
thereby justifying a (further) raising of that bar. And so forth. 
 205. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 231 (2013). 
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monopolist’s refusal to deal with a horizontal rival. Because of the 
particular risks of false positives posed by claims targeting such con-
duct, the Court created uniquely stringent requirements for plaintiffs 
bringing such claims. Due to the vagaries of language, many other 
types of unilateral conduct—for example, exclusive dealing—could be 
(mis)categorized as “refusals to deal.” But those types of conduct do 
not pose the particular risks noted above. As a result, they should not 
trigger the uniquely stringent refusal-to-deal rules.   
B.   Trinko Is a Narrow Holding 
 The Supreme Court’s Trinko holding arose from the unique facts 
of that case. In particular, most “fundamental” to Trinko’s analysis 
was the fact that the allegedly withheld product had never been “oth-
erwise marketed or available to the public” absent regulatory com-
pulsion.206 This unique fact is present in very few factual scenarios.  
Where it is not present, Trinko does not apply (or is of limited ap-
plicability). If the facts of a given refusal-to-deal case suggest a 
greater potential for anticompetitive harm than was present on the 
singular facts of Trinko, a case-specific analysis is appropriate.207 
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s Trinko opinion, with its heavy emphasis on 
the risk of false positives, was motivated by the unique regulatory 
backdrop in that case. It was not intended to, and should not, serve as 
the normative basis for narrowing the scope of antitrust ad infinitum. 
Trinko is a narrow holding and should be applied as such. 
C.   Antitrust Injury Relates to Types of Harm 
 The antitrust-injury requirement relates to the type of harm al-
leged by a plaintiff. Only harms that result from lessened competition 
are cognizable. Whether a plaintiff has alleged or proven antitrust in-
jury does not depend on the type of remedy sought by that plaintiff. 
Neither does it depend on whether a court could easily or efficiently 
craft a remedy. Such concerns are addressed elsewhere in antitrust 
doctrine. Allowing them to affect antitrust-injury analyses risks dou-
ble-counting error costs and suboptimally skewing outcomes. 
D.   The Balance of Error Costs Has Shifted in the Modern Era 
 To the extent that focusing exclusively on the risk of false positives 
was once justified in the antitrust context, such a focus is inappropri-
ate in the twenty-first century. Antitrust doctrine has imposed new 
                                                                                                                       
 206. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 
(2004). 
 207. See Hovenkamp, supra note 192. 
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and more stringent elements for plaintiffs to prove that particular 
types of conduct are anticompetitive, refined other elements of plain-
tiffs’ claims (e.g., antitrust injury) to weed out baseless complaints, 
and imposed heightened pleading standards on plaintiffs and new im-
pediments for plaintiffs pursuing class-action litigation. Against this 
backdrop, the need for the error-cost framework to serve its intended 
purpose—as a neutral tool for improving decisionmaking—is especially 
vital. False negatives, as well as false positives, must factor into error-
cost analyses. Where available, empirical retrospectives of the impact 
of prior rule changes should inform such analyses. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Taken as a whole, the antitrust jurisprudence of Neil Gorsuch ex-
hibits a sophisticated understanding and application of existing doc-
trine. It also contains some areas for improvement. Gorsuch appears to 
value a coherent, transparent, efficient, and welfare-maximizing body 
of antitrust law. To further those goals, these areas warrant correction 
in future cases. Because Gorsuch brings such a unique wealth of ex-
pertise to the topic, thereby facilitating extensive examination, his de-
cisions offer lessons of value to the broader antitrust enterprise. 
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